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1 Introduction
Direct democratic institutions change how political decisions are reached. A classic ques-
tion is whether the presence of direct democratic institutions affects the extent of state
intervention (e.g. Wagschal, 1997; Matsusaka, 2004; Funk and Gathmann, 2013; Walter,
2019). In a recent comprehensive literature review, Matsusaka (2018) shows that effects
differ between direct democratic institutions and depend on features of the representative
system. Most notably, while financial referendums are consistently observed to have a
negative effect on state intervention, the evidence is more mixed in case of popular ini-
tiatives. Finally, little is known about the effect of law referendums and earlier periods
more generally (for the latter, an exception is Matsusaka, 2000).
We add to this literature in two ways. First, echoing Hug (2009), we argue that to
better understand how direct democratic institutions work, we need to analyze how they
interact with the representative system. While the literature has shown the effect of direct
democractic institutions to depend on features of the representative system (e.g. Gerber,
1996b; Boehmke et al., 2015; Matsusaka, 2018), there has been little research focused
specifically on understanding which features of the representative system matter. We
explore an aspect of the respresentative system that is particularly important in shaping
decision-making processes: the size of the governing coalition (Bawn and Rosenbluth,
2006; Persson et al., 2007). We thus formulate theoretical expectations on how different
direct democratic institutions interact with coalition size in affecting public spending.
Second, based on newly collected data, we examine the relationship between three
different direct democratic institutions, coalition size, and public spending over the period
from 1860 to 2015. Empirically, we explore subnational variation in Switzerland, which
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is one of the most prominent cases relying on direct democracy (including at subnational
level). Importantly, Switzerland’s high level of fiscal decentralization means that most
public spending occurs at subnational level. Switzerland also features a diversity of direct
democratic institutions. We focus on three in particular.
Popular initiatives1 allow voters to put policy proposals to popular votes (subject
to signature requirements and collection periods) without consulting or requiring the
approval of legislative or executive bodies. If approved at the ballot box, proposals must
be implemented. In contrast, law referendums2 allow citizens to challenge laws previously
passed by parliament (again subject to signature requirements and collection periods).
If law referendums are approved at the ballot box, laws are null and void. Finally,
financial referendums3 set a monetary threshold for public spending. If policies surpass
this threshold, popular votes are either mandatory or can be held if enough signatures
are collected in the required period. If financial referendums are approved at the ballot
box, public money will not be spent.
Our empirical analysis finds the effect of popular initiatives to depend on the size of
the governing coalition. Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) show that single-party governments
spend less than multi-party governments. We observe that when only few parties are in
government, voters respond to the undersupply of public goods by launching initiatives
that aim at expanding public spending. However, this positive effect on public spending
disappears as coalition size increases.
In addition, in line with the existing literature (e.g. Funk and Gathmann, 2011), we
1Sometimes also referred to as citizens’ or voters’ initiative.
2Sometimes also referred to as optional referendum, popular referendum, veto referendum, petition
referendum, or abrogativo.
3Sometimes also referred to as budget refrendums or fiscal referendums.
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find that financial referendums slow down the growth of public spending. However, the
effect does not vary with coalition size.
In contrast, unlike earlier research that emphasized the veto player effect of law ref-
erendums (e.g. Wagschal, 1997), we find no negative effect of law referendums on public
spending. Instead, we argue that law referendums affect public spending in possibly un-
expected ways, as they operate as a sword of Damocles, in response to which governments
may forge oversized coalitions for laws where they fear defeat at the ballot box (for an
early formulation of this argument, see Neidhart, 1970). Empirically, the anticipation of
such direct democratic challenges leads to more public spending, which compensates for
the more direct veto player effect of law referendums, ultimately resulting in a null effect
on public spending.
Finally, we find that the relationship between direct democratic institutions, coalition
size, and public spending does not change over time. Employing three different empirical
strategies to identify time-variant effects, we observe the mechanisms to be stable and
robust despite the long period under investigation (1860-2015).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section develops our theoretical expec-
tations about how the different direct democratic institutions interact with coalition size
in affecting public spending. Subsequently, we discuss our case selection, the research
design, and the data. We then turn to the empirical examination of our theoretical
expectations. A final section concludes.
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2 Direct Democracy and the Representative System
The relationship between direct democracy and public spending is the subject of a rich
literature. According to Vatter et al. (2019, 177-178), there are basically two schools of
thought. Highlighting the veto player function of direct democracy, especially in the form
of financial referendums (cf. Hug and Tsebelis, 2002), several scholars observe a negative
effect on public spending (e.g. Romer and Rosenthal, 1979; Matsusaka, 1995; Wagschal,
1997; Obinger, 1998; Feld and Matsusaka, 2003; Funk and Gathmann, 2011, 2013). Other
scholars, in the tradition of Downs (1957), argue that more direct participation, especially
in the form of popular initaitives, may lead to more state intervention due to democra-
cies’ inherent tendency to redistribute (e.g. Freitag and Vatter, 2006; Asatryan, 2016;
Asatryan et al., 2017; Blume et al., 2009; Blume and Voigt, 2012; Walter, 2019). In an
encompassing literature review, Matsusaka (2018) finds that financial referendums are
consistently observed to have a negative effect on state intervention. In contrast, the
evidence is more mixed in case of popular initiatives (see also Morger and Schaltegger,
2018). Finally, comparatively little is known about the effect of law referendums.
In this section, we develop a series of theoretical expectations about how popular
initiatives, law referendums, and financial referendums relate to public spending. Most
notably, we explore how these direct democratic institutions interact with the representa-
tive system. The literature has repeatedly shown the effect of direct democractic institu-
tions to depend on features of the representative system (e.g. Gerber, 1996b; Hug, 2009;
Boehmke et al., 2015; Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016; Matsusaka, 2018). Yet, there
is comparatively little research focused specifically on understanding which features of
the representative system matter. We examine a specific feature, which is of particu-
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lar importance in shaping political decision-making processes: the size of the governing
coalition, here understood as the number of parties forming the government.
The existing literature has shown coalition size to matter for public expenditure (e.g.
Volkerink and de Haan, 2001; Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Braeuninger, 2005; Bawn
and Rosenbluth, 2006; Persson et al., 2007). Conceiving of the political space as being
composed of a limited number of societal groups, this literature argues that the groups’
welfare is a function of public spending. Government participation provides political
parties with the possibility to channel resources to their constituencies. Yet, spending
decisions are made under cost constraints that change with the size of a party’s support
base. In small coalitions, parties represent the interest of multiple societal groups that
constitute a large part of the population. As a result, they have to balance the demand
for different public goods with limited scope to externalize costs (assuming that the
financial burden for public spending is borne by all societal groups). In contrast, parties
in large coalitions depend on smaller constituencies, respectively, with more homogeneous
preferences for spending, allowing them to externalize costs to a larger share of the
population. This simple but powerful argument implies that public spending increases
with the number of parties partaking in the governing coalition.4
How does coalition size interact with the relationship between direct democratic insti-
4We follow Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) in arguing that this logic applies to all coalition governments
and that governments – rather than legislatures – are the relevant decision makers on the public budget.
However, it should be noted that this fiscal commons argument applies best to classic parliamentary
democracies. In contrast, Swiss cantonal governments are directly elected, although they can virtually
always rely on a majority coalition in parliament. There is thus no single majority coalition that de-
termines all political outcomes. However, it would certainly be wrong to argue that the creation of ad
hoc coalitions for each spending decision occurs randomly. Instead, we strongly expect a relationship
between government and spending coalitions. For instance, in case of a coalition government consisting
of two parties, we should expect these two parties to form the large majority of these spending coali-
tions. In contrast, in case of a coalition government consisting of four parties, we should expect spending
coalitions to be on average larger and often consist of these very four parties. Hence, although Swiss
cantonal governments are hardly the textbook example for the fiscal commons literature, we expect the
logic to apply nonetheless.
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tutions and public spending? In principle, we can distinguish between direct and indirect
effects of direct democratic institutions (Neidhart, 1970; Gerber, 1996a; Matsusaka and
McCarthy, 2001; Matsusaka, 2014). Consider the case of law referendums, which allow
citizens to collect signatures against a newly legislated law. By definition, this institu-
tion’s direct effect is to block new legislation and by doing so limit the creation of new
government action with spending implications (e.g. Immergut, 1990; Hug and Tsebelis,
2002). Yet, such institutions might also have indirect effects. In the case of law refer-
endums, indirect effects may result from the anticipation of referendum challenges. If
governments and legislators are strategic, governments may be enticed to forge oversized
coalitions to avoid defeat at the ballot box (e.g. Neidhart, 1970; Gerber, 1996a). In this
case, the indirect effect of law referendums might in fact increase public spending.
We expect direct democratic institutions to differ in the way they interact with the
representative system. Therefore, we discuss the interaction between direct democratic
institutions and coalition size for each institution separately. We start with popular
initiatives. Subsequently, we discuss law referendums and, finally, financial referendums.
2.1 Popular Initiatives
Popular initiatives extend proposal power to groups outside the governing coalition
(Smith and Tolbert, 2004; Leemann, 2015; Morger and Schaltegger, 2018). The direct
effect of popular initiatives is thus to give groups outside the governing coalition the
possibility to put their spending preferences on the political agenda. In Switzerland,
popular initiatives allow proposing a bill without consulting or requiring the approval of
legislative or executive bodies. Therefore, popular initiatives provide the proposer with
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great flexibility to engineer an optimal coalition (Leemann, 2015, 601). The direct effect
of popular initiatives should thus lead to more public spending (e.g. Freitag and Vatter,
2006; Asatryan, 2016; Asatryan et al., 2017).
Moreover, this direct effect should be particularly strong in case of small governing
coalitions. Given that the level of public spending is lower in case of small governments,
societal groups’ spending preferences are least served in such situations. As a result,
they have a strong incentive to employ popular initiatives to increase public spending (in
their favor). In addition, it implies that the smaller the number of parties in government,
the more likely that societal groups not represented in government will, ceteris paribus,
succeed in forming a winning coalition (Walter, 2019). In contrast, in case of large
governing coalitions, parties have a narrower voter base and, thus, can externalize a
higher share of the costs, which should lead to higher levels of public spending (e.g.
Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). This means, in turn, that there are fewer incentives to
employ initiatives to increase public spending and there is a more limited potential to
form a winning coalition.
Yet, popular initiatives also have indirect effects. With a view on the interaction
with coalition size, we want to emphasize their role in splitting government coalitions.
Popular initiatives can make it more difficult for coalition governments to externalize
costs, because outside groups can use popular initiatives to propose alternatives to parts
of the governing coalition. This indirect, coalition-splitting effect of popular initiatives
makes credible commitments within coalitions more difficult (cf. Bäck and Lindvall, 2015).
In doing so, popular initiatives can break up package deals in coalitions and prevent
excessive spending that is externalized to groups outside the governing coalition.5 The
5These reflections build on the agenda control literature associated with Romer and Rosenthal (1979).
8
indirect effect of popular initiatives should thus reduce public spending.
We expect this indirect, expenditure-reducing effect of popular initiatives to become
more relevant with coalition size. It is easy to see why. The smaller the governing
coalition (understood as the number of parties forming the coalition), the more difficult
it becomes to break the coalition. At the most extreme, the government consists of only
one party. In contrast, in case of large governing coalitions, there is also a large number
of potential defectors, thus increasing the likelihood that popular initiatives have the
discussed indirect effect.
Based on these mechanisms, we expect popular initiatives to have a positive effect
on public spending in presence of small coalition governments (the direct effect prevails),
while we expect popular initiatives to have a negative effect on public spending in case
of large coalition governments (the indirect effect prevails).
2.2 Law Referendums
Law referendums have a direct effect on the policy process by being successfully employed.
For instance, successful law referendums prevent the adoption of new laws or amendments
that would have been implemented in the absence of a popular vote. If every legislative
act is potentially subject to a law referendum, political decision-making processes are
confronted with additional veto players, which affects the law-making process globally
(Hug and Tsebelis, 2002). This direct effect of referendums is likely to slow down the
growth of the state.
Yet, given our focus on how direct democratic institutions interact with governing coalitions, these
arguments differ from contributions such as Matsusaka (2014), which also emphasize direct and indirect
effects of popular initiatives, but focus on how the initiative process can change policy indirectly by
providing a threat that induces the governing coalition to change policy (compared to the actual use of
popular initiatives).
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This negative effect should increase with coalition size (i.e. become more negative),
because large coalitions tend to increase public spending, but this public spending does
not necessarily benefit groups outside the coalition government. Hence, when large coali-
tion governments are in power, outside groups are even more incentivized to challenge
laws passed by parliament, because public spending is likely to strongly deviate from
their spending preferences.
Yet, law referendums can also influence the policy process indirectly (Hug, 2004;
Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016). The credible threat of powerful interest groups or
political parties to employ referendums can push legislators to change or abandon policy
proposals. Given that outcomes in popular votes are to a certain extent unpredictable,
members of parliament have an incentive to accommodate the interests of all relevant
groups. The goal is the anticipation or withdrawal of referendum challenges. As a result,
law referendums incentivize political decision-makers to create oversized coalitions in
support of specific policies to avoid defeat at the ballot box. Ultimately, this anticipation
effect implies that governments try to accommodate the policy preferences of all (or
most) societal groups capable of launching a referendum (for an early formulation of this
argument, see Neidhart, 1970).6 As these policy preferences of societal groups typically
result in further spending, this anticipation effect should lead to more public spending.
Coalition size is likely to accentuate this positive effect on public spending. Larger
government coalitions consist of parties with relatively small, but homogeneous con-
stituencies, which allow them to externalize costs to a larger share of the population (e.g.
Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). Hence, in the case of large coalitions, the interests of an
6For related arguments in the US context and with regard to popular initiatives, see Gerber (1996a),
Matsusaka and McCarthy (2001), and Matsusaka (2014).
10
even larger number of small groups must be accommodated in order to avoid defeat at
the ballot box, which is likely to increase public spending even further.7
Whether the direct or indirect effect of law referendums on public spending prevails
is an empirical question. Yet, we believe the indirect effect of law referendums to be
more important because the large majority of political decisions are made exclusively
within the representative system, while only a few policies are challenged in the people’s
court. Put differently, all political decisions are made in the “shadow” of a referendum
challenge. As a consequence, the number of political decisions that are subject to the
indirect effect clearly outnumbers the number of decisions subject to the direct effect of
law referendums.
2.3 Financial Referendums
Like law referendums, financial referendums are subject to direct and indirect effects.
Yet, empirical research has consistently found a negative effect on public spending (cf.
Matsusaka, 2018). In the case of financial referendums, politicians propose a policy, re-
sulting in a certain amount of additional public spending. If the monetary threshold
triggering a financial referendum is crossed, citizens have the opportunity to approve the
policy. If citizens accept the proposal, the policy will be implemented and lead to the
expected costs. In contrast, if citizens decline, the policy will not be implemented and
the expected costs will not materialize. Hence, with regard to direct effects, financial
referendums should have a negative effect on public spending. In addition, for reasons
discussed above, this negative effect should become stronger as governments are increas-
7This argument assumes that coalition size reflects a more fragmented party system more generally.
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ingly spendthrift. As a consequence, the negative effect should increase with government
coalition size.
Of course, governments might anticipate the possibility of a financial referendum
(indirect effect). For instance, decision-makers might be incentivized to create oversized
coalitions in support of specific policies to avoid defeat at the ballot box. Yet, for two
reasons, such anticipation effects are less likely in the case of financial referendums.
First, financial referendums are often mandatory once a certain monetary threshold
is crossed, which implies that financial compensation cannot prevent the referendum, but
only tilt the outcome of the popular vote in one’s favor. In addition, such anticipation
effects leading to higher levels of public spending also increase the likelihood of crossing
the monetary threshold triggering a financial referendum in the first place.
Second, in the case of financial referendums, anticipation strategies also include at-
tempts to structure policies in an attempt to stay below the monetary threshold that
triggers financial referendums (e.g. by splitting policy projects into several smaller ones,
which all stay below the spending level triggering a financial referendum). If they suc-
ceed, the financial referendum can be avoided and the money can be spent as planned.
Yet, there are often clear limits with regard to how policies can be restructured to such
an end.
Hence, similar to law referendums, we expect direct and indirect effects to work against
each other in the case of financial referendums. However, given these additional difficulties
in anticipating referendum challenges, we expect the direct effect to prevail in the case of
financial referendums.
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3 Case Selection, Data, and Research Design
We examine the conditional effect of direct democratic institutions on public spending us-
ing subnational (cantonal level) data from Switzerland. Two features make Switzerland a
good choice for our analysis. First, all Swiss cantons know direct democratic institutions.
Yet, there is considerable variation across time and space. While some cantons intro-
duced these instruments early, others were laggards (Leemann, 2019). Similarly, while
some cantons make the recourse to direct democratic instruments easy, others feature
more restrictive rules.
Second, most public spending is located at subnational level. Despite several decades
of fiscal centralization, only 32% of public spending is located at federal level (data for
2016 from the Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung 2017). In contrast, 41% of public spend-
ing is located at cantonal level (the remaining 27% is primarily located at municipality
level). In addition, there is considerable variation across time and space, as we show in
Figure 1 below.
We are of course not the first to focus on Swiss cantons to examine the link between
direct democratic institutions and public policies. Several researchers have used simi-
lar research designs to examine the effect of direct democracy on public spending (e.g.
Kirchgässner et al., 1999; Feld and Matsusaka, 2003; Freitag and Vatter, 2006; Funk and
Gathmann, 2011) or other socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Frey, 1994; Feld and Savioz,
1996; Freitag and Vatter, 2000).
We have engaged in a considerable data collection effort. First, we have collected
public spending data in 5-year intervals from the public budget reports of the cantonal
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governments, covering the period 1830-1930 (Emmenegger et al., 2020).8 Subsequently,
we have merged our data with that provided by Funk and Gathmann (2011), which covers
the period 1890-2000 and were obtained from federal records (most notably the Federal
Office of Statistics). Note that no federal records are available before 1890. Finally, we
have extended the dataset to cover the period 2000-2015, again based on federal records.
Both data collection strategies have their specific strengths and weakenesses. Cantonal
budget reports are closer to the “source”. Yet, there is a risk that cantonal definitions
differ as to what belongs to public spending (e.g. separate budgets for cantonal monopo-
lies on the salt trade). Federal records might provide more comparable information. Yet,
federal records are more valid only if the data provided by the cantons correspond to the
federal guidelines. The overlap of 40 years (1890-1930) in our data and that provided
by Funk and Gathmann (2011) allowed us to explore such differences. In some cases, we
went back to the cantonal archives to find additional budgets that were not part of the
official cantonal budget reports (e.g. separate budgets for public schools in Obwalden).
In other cases, we found that cantons reported incomplete data to the federal administra-
tion (e.g. Appenzell Innerrhodes reported data only for its finance department, but not
public spending by other cantonal departments). Once we had all discrepancies cleared,
we merged the data to obtain a dataset covering the period 1830-2015. For the sake of
consistency, we use all data in 5-year intervals.
To make the data comparable over time and across cantons, we employ official ex-
change rates and the consumer price index (prices in 2005 Swiss francs).9 In addition, we
8We have not collected data for the canton of Jura, which seceded from Bern only in 1979. Jura is
thus excluded from the analysis.
9The Swiss franc was officially introduced in 1850. We use the official exchange rates in 1850 to
convert earlier currencies into Swiss francs.
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divided public spending by the cantonal population to account for different canton sizes.
Finally, we transformed the data with the natural logarithm. In Figure 1, we plot the
growth of spending in all cantons with representative systems. Unsurprisingly, the figure
shows a clear upward trend in the period 1830-2015. Yet, we also observe considerable
variation across time and space, which we will explore in the empirical section.
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Second, we rely on data on the institutionalized rules of direct democratic instruments
for the period 1830-2015. For the purpose of the paper, we distinguish between popular
initiatives, law referendums, and financial referendums. We rely on all cantons that had
a representative system throughout the period of investigation. We therefore exclude the
six small cantons that rely on citizen assemblies (Glarus, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Uri and
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both Appenzell).
Direct democratic institutions vary with regard to the ease to which they can be put
to use. The existing literature has used this variation to identify the effect of direct
democratic institutions on political outcomes. Researchers have employed proxies for the
economic costs of using direct democratic institutions related to variations in signature
requirements and collection periods to capture these institutions’ effects (e.g. Stutzer,
1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Torgler, 2002). More precisely,
the higher the signature requirements (relative to the population of the relevant political
unit) and the shorter the collection period, the higher the economic costs of using direct
democratic institutions.
Our measures for popular initiatives and law referendums are composite indices and
come from Leemann (2019). Both indices range from 0 to 6 with higher values displaying
lower “costs” of using direct democratic instruments, i.e. lower signature requirements
and longer signature collection periods. Figure 2 shows the extent to which cantonal
constitutions grant the citizenry participatory rights. Red lines capture law referendums,
while blue lines capture popular initiatives. Higher values indicate that it is easier to
force a ballot vote on a policy that has been passed in parliament (law referendum) or
force a popular vote on a specific proposal (popular initiative). We provide more detailed
information on the indices in the appendix (see section 6.2).
We also examine the effect of financial referendums on public spending. Existing
analyses have often used rather simple measures of financial referendums, typically a
dummy variable capturing its existence (e.g. Funk and Gathmann, 2011). Instead, we
use the deflated monetary threshold per capita for financial referendums (for a similar
16
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Note: Red lines show values for law referendums and blue lines show values for popular initia-
tives.
approach, see Feld and Matsusaka, 2003). Put differently, we take advantage of the fact
that the “stinginess” of financial referendums varies across cantons and time, with some
cantons enabling financial referendums in the case of small expenditures, while others
rule out the financial referendum even for relatively large expenditures. Figure 3 shows
how the deflated monetary thresholds per capita developed in the period 1830 to 2015.
In line with the literature, we expect the financial referendum to have a stronger effect
in the case of low monetary thresholds (deflated and per capita). As a consequence, we
expect the coefficient of our indicator of financial referendums to be positive (because
high thresholds indicate a comparatively permissive financial referendum).
17
This operationalization implies that we are not working with an index comparable to
the ones used for popular initiatives and law referendums. The reason is that in many
Swiss cantons, a popular vote is mandatory if a policy surpasses a certain predefined
monetary threshold. As a consequence, in these cases, there are no signature requirements
and collection periods. Instead, we capture variation across cantons and over time by
means of the deflated monetary threshold per capita triggering a financial referendum.
In the case of financial referendums, we are, however, confronted with a challenge. If
the financial referendum has not been adopted (yet), we have no data for the monetary
threshold. This is not a problem with our indices of popular initiatives and law refer-
endums, which conceptualize the recourse to popular initiatives and law referendums in
terms of associated “costs”. In this operationalization, the absence of popular initiatives
and law referendums, respectively, corresponds to the highest possible costs on the index
(score is 0). In the case of financial referendums, we follow two strategies to deal with
such cases. First, in the absence of a financial referendum, we assign a value of 0 to
the monetary threshold. Second, we add a binary indicator that takes on the value of 1
when a canton does not have the financial referendum institution. This is the modified
zero-order regression described by Greene (1993) and Maddala (1977) as a solution to
partial missingness.
Third, we rely on data on the political composition of cantonal governments for the
period 1848-2017 (Walter and Emmenegger, 2019).10 In line with the previous literature
(e.g. Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006), we use the number of parties in government as theo-
retically relevant predictor of public spending. In addition, we control for the seat share
10For two cantons, data is missing for parts of the 19th century (Argovia 1848-1885 and Schaffhouse
1848-1876).
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Note: The canton of Neuchatel (NE) has a different scale on the y-axis.
of left parties to control for partisan effects on public spending (Schmitt and Zohlnhoe-
fer, 2019). Finally, the previous literature has linked parliamentary fragmentation to
higher government spending, especially in political systems in which governments are
directly elected (Eslava and Nupia, 2017). To proxy parliamentary fragmentation, we
use a binary variable to capture whether proportional representation is employed to elect
representatives for the legislative.
In addition, we use a number of control variables to account for socio-economic influ-
ences on government spending. Given that GDP data is not available, we use the size of
the first and second sectors, infant mortality, and physician density as proxies. Further-
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more, we measure demographic pressures with the dependency ratio, i.e. the share of the
population below the age of 15 and above 64. We also include the size of the population,
transformed by the natural logarithm, to capture changes in the denominator of our de-
pendent variable. Lastly, we use the logarithm of federal subsidies per capita. A table
with summary statistics is presented in the appendix (see section 6.1).
The combined data covers the period 1860-2015 and is measured in 5-year intervals.
To estimate the effect of direct democratic instruments on public spending, we rely on
an error correction model and employ the following specification. First, we include can-
ton and year fixed effects (FE) to control for unobserved constant heterogeneity and
common shocks. Second, we add a lag of the outcome variable (public spending) to all
specifications (LDV). Finally, standard errors are clustered by cantons.
4 Empirical Tests
In this section, we examine our expectations. All models that we employ can be described
by the following equation:
∆yi,t = βLDV yi,t−1 + βX i,t + αi + γt + εi,t,
whereas αi are unit fixed effects, γt are time fixed effects, and εi,t is a normally distributed
error term. Our main independent variables as well as our control variables are captured
by the stacked matrix Xi,t with a vector of coefficients β. This specification helps to
isolate the relationship between cantonal spending and the institutional setting. To shield
against spurious correlations due to common trends, we add unit as well as time fixed
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effects. General leveling effects are absorbed by lagged per capita spending βLDV yi,t−1.
11
Model 1 in Table 1 includes all variables as well as the interaction of the popular
initiative with the number of parties in government. In Model 2, the interaction is set up
with the law referendum. Model 3 looks at the interaction with the financial referendum.
Finally, Model 4 includes all three interactions simultaneously. The findings are consistent
across all specifications displayed in Table 1.
Three observations can made based on Table 1. First, there is clear empirical sup-
port for the argument that the association of popular initiatives and public spending is
dependent on the number of parties in government. When only few parties are in govern-
ment, popular initiatives have a positive effect on public spending, but this positive effect
becomes weaker as the number of parties in government increases. Second, we cannot
observe any statistically significant relationship between law referendums, coalition size,
and public spending. Third, the models suggest that the effect of financial referendums
is not dependent on the number of parties in government. In all models, the association
is significant with the expected (positive) sign, whereas the interaction terms in Models
3 and 4 do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
In the appendix, we present a number of robustness checks in section 6.4. We re-
estimate the same models but also include the small citizen assembly cantons in Table 6.
The inclusion of these small cantons – which also have very extensive direct democratic
rights – does not alter the substantive results. In Table 7, we drop the highly urbanized
11Please note that even though our model specification is restrictive, it does not ensure that we
can identify causal relationships. Previous approaches have therefore used temporal or spatial lags as
instruments to address such endogeneity concerns (Feld and Matsusaka, 2003; Funk and Gathmann,
2011). However, recent methodological contributions have shown that these strategies are build on
problematic assumptions and do not solve the problem that they are trying to address (Bellemare et al.,
2017; Betz et al., 2018). As a result, we rely on this more conventional approach.
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Table 1: Direct Democracy and Government Spending, 1860-2015
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of Parties 0.07∗∗ 0.03 0.04∗ 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Popular Initiatives 0.04· 0.02 0.01 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Financial Referendum (Threshold) 0.14∗ 0.16∗ 0.33∗ 0.31·
(0.06) (0.07) (0.16) (0.18)
With Financial Referendum −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Law Referendum 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Lag Dependent Variable −0.29∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Share First Sector −0.40· −0.39 −0.38 −0.39
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
Share Second Sector −0.23 −0.18 −0.14 −0.23
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
Dependency Ratio 0.96∗ 0.99· 0.98∗ 1.04∗
(0.47) (0.51) (0.50) (0.46)
Infant Mortality −0.30 −0.30 −0.29 −0.32
(0.53) (0.52) (0.51) (0.54)
Share Left Parties −0.06 −0.07 −0.07 −0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Proportional Representation −0.08∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Physician Density −0.10∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln Population Size 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
ln Federal Subsidies 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Num. Par. * Initiative −0.01∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Num. Par. * Law Referednum 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
Num. Par. * Fin. Referendum −0.07 −0.07
(0.06) (0.07)
R2 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52
Adj. R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46
Num. obs. 628 628 628 628
RMSE 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
cantons Basel and Geneva from our sample. In addition, we exclude all observations
for Neuchâtel after 1970 (see Table 8) because the canton displays unusually high values
for the financial referendum (see Figure 3). These additional model specifications yield
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substantively identical results. Put differently, the estimation results are in line with the
results presented here.
In addition, we also explore whether these estimates are stable over 155 years or
whether there is any temporality to them (Matsusaka, 2004). Below, we show that these
results remain stable in the face of three independent modeling strategies all aimed at
uncovering temporal change in the estimates. However, first, we take a closer look at the
interaction terms.
4.1 Interaction Terms
We now turn to the interpretation of the interaction terms. In this section, we focus on
illustrating the short-run effects of direct democratic institutions for different coalition
sizes. Our discussion of the magnitude of the long-run effects under different scenarios
can be found in the appendix (section 6.5).
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Note: Based on estimates fromModel 4. Simulated marginal effect with 90% and 95% confidence
intervals.
We first examine the effect of popular initiatives. Across all specifications presented in
Table 1, we find a conditional effect of popular initiatives on public spending. Figure 4
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displays the marginal effect of popular initiatives conditional on the number of parties in
government. We find that for small governments consisting of only one or two parties,
there is a positive marginal effect for the popular initiative. This positive effect turns
negative as the number of parties in government increases. This result is in line with our
theoretical argument.
Figure 5 displays the marginal effect of law referendums conditional on coalition size.
The marginal effect increases for larger coalitions. Interestingly, the effect is significant
for large coalition governments. These results provide some limited support to the argu-
ment that in anticipation of law referendums, governments try to foster large bill-specific
coalitions, which in turn are linked to higher spending.
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Note: Based on estimates fromModel 4. Simulated marginal effect with 90% and 95% confidence
intervals.
Finally, Figure 6 displays the marginal effect of financial referendums conditional on
coalition size. The marginal effect appears to be decreasing, but the interaction parameter
is not distinguishable from 0. In addition, the marginal effect is straddling the threshold
for significance. In case of two-party coalition governments, the effect is significantly
different from zero. Together with results displayed in Table 1, this finding suggests that
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financial referendums are linked to lower public spending, which is consistent with our
theoretical expectations (remember that we examine the monetary threshold triggering
a referendum). However, we do not find strong evidence that the effect of financial
referendums is conditional on coalition size.
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Note: Based on estimates fromModel 4. Simulated marginal effect with 90% and 95% confidence
intervals.
Error correction models have a dynamic component. Yet, the shown estimates as well
as the visualizations of the interaction terms display only the short-run effects. In the
appendix, we therefore discuss long-run effects of all direct democratic instruments (see
section 6.5).
4.2 Stability over Time
Analyzing data over more than 150 years immediately leads to the question whether these
estimates are stable over time or whether one is missing part of the historical processes
by imposing a too strict model specification (Wawro and Katznelson, 2014). The models
presented so far all rely on fixed parameters over time, thus assuming that the effect of
direct democratic institutions remained stable over time. At first, this might seem like a
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heroic assumption but it is in line with what we typically assume when we analyze the
effects of electoral rules on strategic behavior (cf. Cox, 1997).
However, rather than just asserting this point, we also conduct a number of empirical
tests that are likely to show if these effects vary over time. In total, we employ three dif-
ferent strategies to show this over-time stability. First, we explicitly interact explanatory
factors with time variables (and the square thereof) to allow for different functional forms.
Second, we estimate the model only on slices of the data and test whether estimates on
early data are different from estimates on later data (Egger et al., 2019). Finally, we use
hierarchical models and model parameters as random effects and inspect how their time
disturbances cluster (Wawro and Katznelson, 2014).
4.2.1 Interacting with Year Variable
In the first step, we interact the interaction terms of the baseline specification in Model
4 with a binary indicator for the 19th century. This simple test should allow us to see if
there is any difference between the 19th and the 20th century. As an alternative and more
flexible approach, we also interact the term with the year and in subsequent models with
squared years.
None of these interactions with century dummies, years, or years squared are signifi-
cant (see Table 2). There is thus no indication that the effects vary over time. While this
is a somewhat restrictive approach, as we impose a clear functional form, we also present
two more flexible approaches in the next two subsections.
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Table 2: Temporal Heterogeneity Tests (Controls and Constitutive Terms omitted)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Init. * Num. Par. * 19th Cent. −0.01
(0.03)
Law Ref. * Num. Par. * 19th Cent. 0.00
(0.02)
Fin. Ref. * Num. Par. * 19th Cent. −0.06
(0.54)
Init. * Num. Par. * Year 0.00·
(0.00)
Law Ref. * Num. Par. * Year −0.00
(0.00)
Fin. Ref. * Num. Par. * Year −0.00
(0.00)
Init. * Num. Par. * Year sq. 0.00
(0.00)
Law Ref. * Num. Par. * Year sq. −0.00
(0.00)
Fin. Ref. * Num. Par. * Year sq. −0.00
(0.00)
R2 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55
Adj. R2 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49
Num. obs. 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628
RMSE 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
4.2.2 Differences between Periods
Following Egger et al. (2019), we divide data into different folds and test whether the
parameter estimates are different. We split the time up into an early and into a late
period. We then re-estimate Model 4 from Table 1 on both folds and compare the two
estimates for the interaction term (delivering β̂int,early fold and β̂int,late fold). In a second
step, we test whether these two parameters are different from each other. We repeat
these two steps, while moving the cut-off between early and late periods from 1880 up to
2000, each time moving ten years forward per step.
For all three interactions, we analyze whether there are any differences between es-
timates based on early folds and late folds. The results of this explorative exercise are
displayed in Figure 7. The top panel shows the results for popular initiatives, the middle
panel shows the results for law referendums, and the bottom panel shows the results
for financial referendums. Across all three panels, there is no clear evidence that the
mechanism changes considerably over time.
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Figure 7: Overtime Stability




















































Note: Top panel: popular initiative, middle panel: law referendum, bottom panel: financial
referendum. The cut-off year (separating early and late fold) is shown on the x−axis. For each
test we take 1,000 draws from the posterior vector and then compare the two draws. The figure
shows the 95% and the 99% confidence interval of the difference of the two coefficients (early
vs late fold).
For the initiative there might be a difference depending on the applied α level thresh-
old. However, as soon as we exclude the three WWII time periods, no single comparison
is significant (see section 6.6 in the appendix). From this second approach, which is
less restrictive than the first one, we take that there is no empirical evidence that this
mechanism changes over time. We move next to an alternative non-restrictive approach,
where we try to impose a less functional form.
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4.2.3 Random Coefficient Modeling
Our final test for stability builds on a hierarchical modeling strategy, where we include
the relevant parameters as random effects. Following Wawro and Katznelson (2014), we
use a hierarchical modeling approach to see if there is a temporal drift in the disturbance
estimates of the relevant parameters. Specifically, rather than estimating the interaction







and νt follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and a variance that is estimated by the
model.
Figure 8 shows the realization of the random component of the random coefficient of
the interaction term for the three institutions. The top panel shows effects for popular
initiatives, the middle panel for law referendums, and the bottom panel for financial
referendums. We see neither any shock nor any drift over time.
In this section, we have provided three tests on whether the main findings of this
paper change over time. We have employed three different strategies that vary in how
much the model imposes on the data. None of these tests indicates that there is a change
over time. The observed effects remain stable from the mid-19th century over the 20th
century into the 21st one.
5 Conclusion
How do direct democratic institutions affect public spending? In this paper, we have
tried to contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we have explored how three direct
democratic institutions (popular initiatives, law referendums, and financial referendums)
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Note: Top panel: Initiative; middle panel: Law referendum; bottom panel: financial referen-
dum. Plot shows realization of random component of the interaction term when estimated as a
hierarchical model using the BRMS package (Bürkner, 2018).
interact with a specific aspect of the representative system, the size of the governing
coalition, to influence public spending. Second, based on newly collected data, we have
examined this relationship between three different direct democratic institutions, coalition
size, and public spending over the period from 1860 to 2015.
This paper thus takes into account the diversity of direct democratic institutions and
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acknowledges that they do not operate in a vacuum but within a representative system
that may condition the effect of direct democratic institutions. While we have only
focused on the institutionalized rules of direct democracy instead of their actual use,
previous research has shown that lower economic costs are strongly linked to a higher
frequency of initiatives and referendums (Leemann, 2015; Asatryan, 2016).
Our results show that the effect of popular initiatives depends on the size of the
governing coalition. In the case of small coalitions, extensive initiative rights are linked
to higher public spending. However, this positive effect on public spending disappears
as coalition size increases. In addition, we find that financial referendums are linked to
lower public spending, which – contrary to our theoretical expectations – does not seem
to be affected by coalition size. In contrast, we find no negative effect of law referendums
on public spending. If anything, law referendums seem to have a positive effect on public
spending, which grows with coalition size, although the effect is significantly different from
zero only for large coalition governments. The reason for this possibly surprising finding
can be found in anticipation effects. Law referendums operate as a sword of Damocles,
which force governments to forge oversized bill-specific coalitions to avoid defeat at the
ballot box (Neidhart, 1970). As governments try to accommodate the policy preferences
of groups capable of launching a law referendum, spending is likely to increase – in
particular if the resulting bill-specific coalition consists of a large number of small groups
with homogeneous preferences, which are capable of externalizing costs to a larger share
of the population (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006).
Finally, we find that the interaction between coalition size and direct democratic in-
stitutions does not change over time and, therefore, persists in a number of different
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socio-economic and political contexts. Apart from different levels of economic develop-
ment, Swiss cantons started out with limited male suffrage and majoritarian electoral
systems and switched to proportional representation and universal suffrage over the last
two centuries. As a result, we are confident that our results will also hold in other contexts
beyond the Swiss cantons.
In sum, these heterogenous effects demonstrate that when studying the relationship
between direct democracy and public spending, researchers have to be attentive to differ-
ences between direct democratic institutions and take into account their embeddedness
in the representative system (cf. Hug, 2009). Yet, certainly more research is needed to
understand which features of the representative system matter and how these different
features relate to each other when moderating the effect of direct democratic institutions
on public spending. In addition, future research should investigate how the use of direct
democratic institutions alters the composition of governing coalitions and the design of
policies in detail. For instance, under what conditions do direct democratic institutions
help to integrate minority interests in the policy process? To answer such questions, the
interaction between representative institutions and direct democracy must be examined
at the micro level.
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